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CONTRACT LAW
Blaser Farms, Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 893 F.2d 259
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Blaser Farms, Inc. ("Blaser"), argued that by missing a
September 1985 "substitute royalty" payment, Anadarko Petroleum
Corporation ("Anadarko") and Enicon Corporation ("Enicon") violated
a special limitation clause of their lease. Accordingly, Blaser contended
that the lease automatically terminated. The district court entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of Anadarko and Enicon. Blaser subsequently
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that summary judgment was properly
granted to Anadarko and Enicon. Although the correct interpretation of
the royalty payment clause required Anadarko to make payments in ad-
vance, Oklahoma law allows consideration of equitable circumstances
that would avoid forfeitures. Because Anadarko spent $300,000 suc-
cessfully connecting a pipeline to the well by December 1985, the court
stated that Oklahoma law was properly applied to conclude that the cir-
cumstances prevented automatic termination of the lease.
Edo Corp. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 911 F.2d 1447
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, Edo Corporation ("Edo"), and defendant, Beech Aircraft
Corporation ("Beech"), entered into a series of research and develop-
ment contracts. The contracts contained "termination for convenience"
and "noncompetition" clauses. Beech subsequently terminated the con-
tracts. Edo brought suit against Beech, claiming that it was entitled to
recovery of "unabsorbed overhead" and to expectancy damages on a
promissory estoppel theory. The district court granted Beech partial
summary judgment and a directed verdict. Edo appealed, claiming that
the district court erred in: (1) refusing to award unabsorbed overhead
damages; (2) finding justification for terminating the contracts;
(3) granting summary judgment against Edo on oral modification of the
contracts; and (4) applying promissory estoppel elements.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings against Edo.
First, the court held that Edo was not entitled to unabsorbed overhead
damages. The court reasoned that Edo failed to show a nexus between
the damages and Beech's termination of the contracts. Second, Beech's
termination of the Edo contracts did not constitute a breach of the
agreements. The court explained that the "termination for conven-
ience" clause was clearly supported by consideration. Third, the state-
ments made did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of an
intent to modify an express term of each agreement. The court rea-
soned that the oral modifications were "too amorphous" to vary any of
the written contracts. Finally, the court held that Edo's promissory es-
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toppel theory failed. The court explained that Edo did not prove Beech
made a promise that Edo could rely on, thereby foregoing other oppor-
tunities. Also, the court stated that Edo lacked good faith belief that it
would be prohibited from pursuing other opportunities.
Equifax Serv., Inc. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Hitz, a California resident, was employed in Southern
California by White & White, a Missouri corporation with its principal
offices in Kansas. White & White was purchased by plaintiff, Equifax
Services, Inc. ("Equifax"). Hitz's employment contract contained a
noncompete clause and provided that it would be governed by Kansas
law. Hitz resigned from Equifax to become president of a newly formed
competing business. Equifax sued to enforce the noncompetition
clause. The district court granted Equifax a preliminary injunction.
Hitz appealed, claiming that the district court erred in: (1) exercising
personal jurisdiction over him; (2) granting the injunction; and (3) de-
nying his change of venue motion.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. First, the
court ruled that the district court had personal jurisdiction over Hitz
because he purposefully affiliated himself with Kansas through his inter-
state contractual relation with Equifax's predecessor firm. Second, the
court upheld the preliminary injunction, noting that Kansas courts prob-
ably would enforce the contractual choice-of-law and noncompetition
provisions and would refuse to weigh any conflict between Kansas and
California's laws and policies. The court also noted that Equifax suc-
ceeded to its predecessor's right to enforce the noncompete clause, and
that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Hitz's violation of
the agreement irreparably harmed Equifax. Finally, the court upheld
the denial of Hitz's change of venue motion because the order was inter-
locutory and not immediately appealable.
Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Applied Genetics International, Inc. ("AGI"), appealed a
summary judgment awarded to defendant, First Affiliated Securities,
Inc. ("FAS"). AGI asserted that the district court erred in holding that a
settlement and release agreement entered into by AGI and FAS was
valid and barred all of AGI's claims against FAS. On appeal, AGI ar-
gued that: (1) the release was procured by economic duress and fraud;
(2) the release was materially breached by FAS; (3) the release did not
cover post-settlement claims; and (4) evidence of oral agreements to the
release should have been allowed.
On de novo review and applying Wyoming law, the Tenth Circuit
reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceed-
ings. First, the Wyoming test for duress was consistent with the test for
economic duress. Specifically, the tests are similar in states which ex-
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pressly recognize economic duress as grounds for avoiding a settlement
agreement. The court then determined that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment on the issue of economic duress. In mak-
ing its decision, the court applied the recognized elements of an unlaw-
ful act, which are absence of a reasonable alternative to enter the
agreement and lack of free will. Moreover, because Wyoming law re-
quires a clear and convincing standard of proof in establishing fraud and
AGI failed to establish each element, summary judgment on the issue of
fraud was proper. Second, the language "present legal interest" in-
cluded more than mere possession. Therefore, summary judgment for
FAS was inappropriate. The court reasoned that the agreement re-
quired AGI's "present legal interest" in the properties to be preserved,
or the agreement was of no force or effect. Third, the phrase "to and
including the date hereof" limited the scope of the release to claims
arising prior to or contemporaneously with the execution of the release.
Consequently, summary judgment was not proper as to the issue of
post-settlement claims. Finally, the district court correctly invoked the
parole evidence rule to prevent incorporation of alleged oral agree-
ments into the written release.
Koch v. Koch, 903 F.2d 1333
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiffs, Charles and David Koch, and defendant, William Koch,
entered into two contracts. The first contract was for the purchase and
sale of stock in Koch Industries. The second contract was the sale of
William's real estate in exchange for Charles and David's interest in a
gold coin collection. When William refused to perform under the real
estate and coin contract, Charles and David sought specific perform-
ance. William counterclaimed, alleging fraud in the inducement and
sought recision of the real estate and coin contract. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Charles and David on the coun-
terclaim and ordered specific performance of the real estate and coin
contract. As part of the specific performance decree, the district court
ordered an appraisal of the coin collection and real estate. When the
appraisers differed on the valuation, the court decreed the final ap-
praisal value. On appeal, William contended the district court erred in:
(1) granting summary judgment when there was a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact regarding the alleged fraudulent inducement to enter into the
real estate and coin transfer; and (2) establishing the value of the real
estate and coins to be transferred under the district court's equitable
power rather than under the terms of the contract.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. First,
the court stated that the real estate and coin contract was a complete and
unambiguous document that did not refer to any other agreement and,
therefore, was not dependent on the stock sale agreement. Second, Wil-
liam urged the district court to resolve the appraisal and not follow the
contract. Accordingly, the court ruled that it would not hear William's
1991]
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attack on the district court's exercise of equitable discretion. Alterna-
tively, the court noted that district courts retain substantial discretion in
ordering specific performance.
Pacific Enter. Oil Co. v. Hertz, 893 F.2d 280
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Hertz, appealed the district court's decision granting
summary judgment for plaintiff, Pacific Enterprise Oil Company ("Terra
Resources"), and denying Hertz's claim for damages. Hertz argued that
Terra Resources had no justification for refusing to honor its oil and gas
lease with Hertz, and that there were genuine issues of fact which pre-
cluded summary judgment. Terra Resources countered that: (1) the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Hertz failed to
show an injury in fact; and (2) Terra Resources was not required to ac-
cept Hertz's assignment because Colorado law requires all sellers to
convey marketable title.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court had juris-
diction since Hertz's judgment in a related court of claims action was
insufficient to fully compensate his losses. The court also stated that
although the Colorado Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue of
whether an implied warranty of marketability extends to the assignment
of oil and gas leases, sufficient authority exists to find such a warranty.
Terra Resources was, therefore, under no duty to accept the assignment
because Hertz did not have title to the lease at the time set for perform-
ance. Finally, the court held that Hertz presented no genuine issue of
material fact. The court explained that in the absence of an express war-
ranty of marketable title in an assignment of an oil and gas lease, Colo-
rado implies the warranty as a matter of law.
Rajala v. Allied Corp., 919 F.2d 610
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, General Poly Corporation ("General Poly"), entered into
several agreements with defendant, Allied Corporation ("Allied"), for
the purchase of certain products. Soon thereafter, General Poly filed for
protection in bankruptcy, and its trustee brought a variety of claims
against Allied. General Poly only prevailed on its claim for breach of
fiduciary duty, thereby obtaining a jury verdict for over $70 million. Al-
lied appealed the jury verdict and the denial of its motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV"). General Poly, on the other
hand, cross-appealed directed verdicts on its fraud, conversion, breach
of contract, and oral contract claims.
The Tenth Circuit held that Allied's motion for JNOV was improp-
erly denied because there was insufficient evidence upon which a rea-
sonable jury would properly conclude that General Poly established a
fiduciary relationship. The court relied on Kansas law, stating that
merely acting for another's benefit will not give rise to fiduciary duties
unless the alleged fiduciary consciously assumed fiduciary responsibili-
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ties. The court also affirmed all the directed verdicts issued by the dis-
trict court. First, General Poly's claim for fraud was barred by the
statute of limitations. The court explained that an action for fraud must
be brought within two years of when it occurs. But, it only accrues when
the fraud is discovered. In the case at hand, the alleged fraud should
reasonable have been discovered in March 1979. The action was filed,
however, in August 1982. Second, the court affirmed the district court's
directed verdict in favor of Allied on a separate claim of fraud. The
court reasoned that General Poly failed to present any evidence support-
ing its argument that an Allied employee knew a product was unavaila-
ble at the time he made an offer to exchange it. Third, since General
Poly did not present sufficient evidence to withstand Allied's motion for
a directed verdict on the fraud claim, its assertion of fraudulently in-
duced consent must likewise fail. Fourth, the court ruled that General
Poly's claim for breach of its written agreement must fail. The court
explained that the written agrement stated that unless General Poly gave
Allied thirty days written notice of its needs, no right of purchase shall
inure. General Poly's failure to supply such notice precluded its claim
for breach of the agreement. Finally, the district court properly directed
a verdict in favor of Allied for the breach of oral argument claim. The
court reasoned that General Poly failed to produce any evidence that it
rejected a product tendered by Allied because it was in violation of the
oral contract.
Sandlin v. Texaco Ref and Mktg., Inc., 900 F.2d 1479
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Sandlin, operated a Texaco station under a franchise
agreement with defendant, Texas Refining and Marketing, Inc.
("TRMI"). As a result of the 1984 Texaco-Getty merger, TRMI ac-
quired a Getty Oil Company station across the street from Sandlin. In
1985, it began operating the station under the Texaco name. In 1986,
TRMI notified Sandlin that his franchise would not be renewed because
it decided to sell the premises and offered to sell him the property for
$216,000. Sandlin successfully sued TRMI for breach of contract and
violation of the federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act ("PMPA").
TRMI appealed, claiming that the jury verdict was not supported by the
evidence.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that the
evidence did not support Sandlin's allegations that TRMI's nonrenewal
decision was not made in good faith and in the normal course of busi-
ness. Also, there was insufficient evidence to support Sandlin's argu-
ment that TRMI failed to make a bona fide offer to sell him the property.
Further, the court decided that TRMI "established a sound commercial
reason" for the nonrenewal decision. TRMI demonstrated that the for-
mer Getty station was more profitable than Sandlin's station. Moreover,
TRMI's offer to sell at a price within the range of its outside appraisals,
and below the price at which the station was listed at the time of the
1991]
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trial, was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, it was a bona fide offer.
The court also reversed Sandlin's judgment on the state breach of con-
tract claim. The court ruled that testimony claiming TRMI rebranded
the Getty station earlier than necessary, and that prices posted at that
station were lower than Sandlin's purchase price, was "self-serving spec-
ulation." Thus, there was no evidence showing that TRMI breached the
good faith covenant inherent in every contract.
Transpower Constructors v. Grand River Dam Auth., 905 F.2d 1413
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Transpower Constructors ("Transpower"), entered a con-
tract to construct a transmission line for defendant, Grand River Dam
Authority ("GRDA"). Co-defendant, Benham Group ("Benham"), was
to represent GRDA for payment and granting extensions of time to
Transpower. Transpower sustained increased costs to complete the
project on time because GRDA caused delays, and Benham refused to
grant extensions. Subsequently, GRDA refused to pay the increased
costs. Transpower was successful in a suit against GRDA and Benham
for breach of contract; the jury also awarded punitive damages for negli-
gence. GRDA and Benham appealed, arguing that the district court
erred in: (1) denying their motions for directed verdict, for judgment
not withstanding the verdict, for altering or amending the verdict, and
for a new trial; (2) calculating damages; and (3) awarding post-judg-
ment interest and certain attorney's fees. Transpower appealed the
court's denial of prejudgment interest.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed all decisions of the district court. First,
on de novo review, there was no indication that the evidence pointed in
favor of GRDA's and Benham's motions. Second, since Transpower es-
tablished sufficient evidence of the fact of damages, the jury may deter-
mine the proper award from the best evidence admitted. Third, in a
diversity action., 28 U.S.C. § 1961 allows for interest on any money judg-
ment in a civil case. Oklahoma law permits recovery of attorney's fees in
a breach of contract action, but not a negligence action. Here, Trans-
power required evidence of Benham's negligence in order to prove
breach of contract. Finally, Transpower was not entitled to prejudg-
ment interest because its damages were not certain or calculable prior to
judgment.
Vanguard Prod., Inc. v. Martin, 894 F.2d 375
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Vanguard Production, Inc. ("Vanguard"), appealed the
district court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants,
attorneys Martin and Morgan and the law firm of Ames, Ashabranner,
Taylor, Lawrence, Laudick and Morgan. On appeal, Vanguard argued
that the district court erred in holding that: (1) an attorney was not
liable for malpractice to persons other than their immediate clients; and
(2) there were insufficient facts to establish a jury question.
[Vol. 68:4
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The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that Morgan
and Martin owed no duty to Vanguard. The court held that the common
law duty of workmanlike performance is in every contract for service.
Accordingly, this duty extends to third party beneficiaries who
foreseeably could be harmed by a breach of such duty. Furthermore,
the court held that under Oklahoma law, the rule is also applicable to
attorneys. Finding that Vanguard pleaded sufficient evidence to raise a
question of fact regarding proximate cause, the court remanded the case
for trial.

